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processes in verbal communication
Abstract: Overspecification in reference is the provision of more information than
is minimally required for a hearer to identify an intended referent, e.g., ‘the stripy
bowl’ in the context of a single bowl. Since this kind of referring expression is
not predicted by traditional accounts of reference, this chapter reviews research
documenting the frequency of such expressions in various contexts. Drawing to-
gether recent empirical findings, it proposes reasons for overspecified reference
from both the speaker’s and the addressee’s perspective. The pragmatic, cognitive
and social significance of overspecification is discussed, and applications of re-
search in this area are considered. We close by suggesting promising future direc-
tions for this strand of research.
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 Introduction
This chapter explores the relationship between human information processing and
its realisation in language, specifically in referring expressions. It does so by inves-
tigating the processes at work when referring expressions contain more informa-
tion than is strictly required (aka overspecification), and examines the interplay of
this aspect of verbal behaviour with not fully manifest communication, i.e. mean-
ing which is conveyed yet remains unsaid.
Reference relates to one of the most fundamental aspects of language; the fact
that speakers use words to uniquely identify properties and entities in the world.
For example, in a statement such as ‘I like this’, the pronoun ‘I’ is used to refer to
the person who made this statement, and ‘this’ is used to refer to an entity or a
property that the speaker has in mind. Even in this simple case though, it is clear
that working out the referent of an expression is not a trivial matter. For example,
uniquely identifying what is referred to by ‘this’ may involve a complex process
taking into account the previous verbal context (what was the conversation
about?), the physical context (is some particular entity visually or otherwise sali-
ent?), and the speaker’s extra-linguistic behaviour (such as gestures and direction
of eye-gaze) among other factors. Indeed, in many instances of communication
there will be competing hypotheses about the referents of the words used. To make
the case, knowing that the speaker is manifestly pointing at a ball a few centime-
tres away from her helps to narrow down the possible referents, but still, which
aspect of the ball is she intending to identify? The colour? Texture? Size or shape?
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We may consider the fact that we do not routinely experience a breakdown of
communication as a tribute to how good humans are in calibrating the use of refer-
ring expressions in such a way that their interlocutor can identify the intended
referential target. As will become clear in the next section, there are rules that
interlocutors tend to follow when producing and understanding referring expres-
sions, and the study of these rules can reveal important aspects of the communica-
tive system. As such, the study of reference is relevant to the study of the integra-
tion of information from multimodal sources in conversation (see this volume,
chapter 17), the understanding of implicitly communicated meaning (see this vol-
ume, chapter 6), and the consideration of possible sources of misunderstanding in
verbal communication (see this volume, chapter 24).
Our particular focus is on overspecification (also referred to as overinformative-
ness), an aspect of the referential use of language in which a speaker provides
more information than is strictly necessary for a hearer to uniquely identify an
intended target referent in a given situation. This aspect of communication is im-
portant because not only does overspecified reference affect comprehension pro-
cesses, but it may also provide a window into some of the cognitive processes
involved in speech production (e.g., the perception of certain features of the refer-
ent, comparison-making between referents and nonreferents in the linguistic and
extralinguistic environment, and perspective-taking and the use of common
ground). This chapter reviews some of the major findings from the adult processing
literature with the aims of describing the incidence of overspecification and classi-
fying some of its causal factors from both the speaker’s and hearer’s perspectives.
It then discusses the pragmatic, cognitive and social implications of overspecifica-
tion, applications for the research findings to date, and suggests future directions
for this domain.
Within the language sciences, this topic spans subdisciplines of cognitive psy-
chology, psycholinguistics, theoretical pragmatics, and the burgeoning field of ex-
perimental pragmatics (Noveck & Sperber 2004; Noveck & Reboul 2008; Katsos &
Cummins 2010; Katsos 2011, i.a.).
 Overspecification: Definitions and theoretical
background
When a speaker needs to point out a referent, she is faced with a range of construc-
tions which could refer to the target entity. Broadly speaking, this referential choice
may include an indefinite noun phrase, e.g., a ball, a demonstrative phrase, e.g.,
that ball, an anaphoric pronoun e.g., it, or a zero anaphor, e.g., there are two balls;
a large ø and a small ø. Standard explanations of how speakers select referential
expressions have focused on cognitive status (e.g., Givón 1983; Ariel 1990; Gundel
et al. 1993; Arnold 1998). When a referent is in focus or highly activated, a ‘lighter’
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referential expression such as the pronoun it is licensed. Conversely, when the
referent is less accessible, a more explicit form such as a definite description the
ball is used. When a target referent is accompanied by another referent of the same
type, a more explicit, modified noun phrase such as the large ball is required.
Restricting our review of the literature to studies investigating full noun phras-
es, experimental data challenge traditional accessibility accounts and support the
notion that when speakers construct referring expressions, they frequently go be-
yond what is minimally required and refer to entities in more detail than is necessa-
ry for an addressee to uniquely identify them, e.g., referring to a target referent as
the large ball in the presence of a single ball (Deutsch & Pechmann 1982; Pechmann
1984, 1989; Mangold & Pobel 1988; Maes, Arts and Noordman 2004; Ferreira,
Slevc & Rogers 2005; Engelhardt, Bailey & Ferreira 2006; Barr 2007; Carbary &
Tanenhaus 2008). Frequently studied using the referential communication para-
digm, speakers have been found to overinform in both laboratory-controlled and
more naturalistic discourse. Referential communication tasks aim to elicit referring
expressions (REs) which highlight one referent from an array of several others
which usually share certain characteristics with the target. An overspecified RE
is one which contains attributes over and above those minimally required for an
addressee to identify the target referent uniquely. For example, a speaker referring
to a large, red triangular target within an array also comprising a small blue trian-
gle and a large red square, as the large red triangle is overinformative in the strict
sense of including more information than is minimally required: either the large
triangle or the red triangle would suffice in this case. Intuitively, speakers do not
always produce minimally distinguishing REs, and it would seem computationally
complex to do this as a complete online scan of the context and calculation of the
distinguishing features would have to be undertaken upon producing any RE. As
discussed below, overinforming may be causally linked to a variety of processes,
including a lack of comparison activity between target and competitors.
Theoretically, overinformative referring expressions run contrary to Grice’s sec-
ond maxim of Quantity which states that speakers are expected to not give more
information than is required (Grice 1975/1989), lest a pragmatic implicature be gen-
erated. This raises the question: what do hearers infer from these widely attested
types of utterance? Answering this question requires an examination of the litera-
ture on contrastive inference (Sedivy et al. 1999; Grodner & Sedivy 2011). However,
there may be alternative consequences of overinforming than pragmatic implica-
ture, e.g., speeding up a hearer’s search for the referent (Mangold & Pobel 1988;
Arts 2004, 2011), or reducing the risk of the signal being lost (Shannon & Weaver
1949).
Within the theory of Conversational Implicature (1975/1989), Grice conceded
that a violation of Quantity-2 or in plain terms, saying too much, was not as serious
a cause for concern (i.e. would not as readily produce implicatures) as violating
other maxims and at the very least, might be ‘merely a waste of time’ (1989: 26).
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However, we argue that overinformative utterances do impact on online interpreta-
tion. The psychological investigation of referential overspecification is becoming a
major research thread within the linguistic and cognitive sciences, furthering the
original philosophical contemplation of reference in human communication.
 The incidence of overspecification in production
Just as overinforming is commonplace in the wild (consider the rich detail given
in narrative fiction or in precise instruction), studies from experimental linguistics
have revealed high rates of overinformativeness. Early research revealed that in
referential communication tasks, 28 % of adults’ expressions were overinformative
(Deutsch & Pechmann 1982), and in a similar experiment 60 % were found to be
so (Pechmann 1984). In a recent study, Koolen et al. (2011) found that around 50 %
of speakers’ referring expressions in their study contained more information than
needed for unique identification of the target. Engelhardt, Bailey & Ferreira (2006)
found that speakers not only supplied modifiers in descriptions when they were
necessary for disambiguation between multiple referents, but they also supplied
them in single-referent conditions in around a third of referring expressions
(though see Davies & Katsos 2013). Cross-linguistically, speakers of Yucatec Maya
have been found to overspecify at very similar levels (33 %: Butler et al. 2011).
One observation from this small sample of research, as well as from the broad-
er survey below is the variable rates of overspecification found in the data. In the
following analysis of representative studies, we find rates of overspecification ran-
ging from 0 % to around 60 %. This can be tentatively explained by the fact that
there are various and interacting contextual factors which impact on the choice of
RE (see recommendations for further research below). It has been argued that
speakers design their REs for efficient identification on the hearer’s part (Arnold
2008), but lower-level speaker-oriented processes may also be at work. The follow-
ing discussion is divided by proposed speaker-oriented and hearer-oriented moti-
vations for overinforming.
 Speaker-oriented reasons for overinforming
. Lack of comparison activity
Felicitous referring expressions must not merely describe indiscriminate features
of a target referent, but crucially, the ways in which the target differs from nonref-
erents. The act of comparing referents to nonreferents is critical in formulating REs,
and affects where they fall on the cline between underinformativeness/ambiguity,
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through minimal contrastiveness, to overinformativeness. Based on the assump-
tion that speech becomes more efficient developmentally, Freedle (1972) proposed
the Minimal Redundancy Hypothesis, which held that adults’ REs would contain
the minimum amount of features required to distinguish the referent from the non-
referent. However, Freedle’s data did not support the hypothesis, as adult partici-
pants included more features than were minimally required for unique identifica-
tion, especially where there were higher numbers of nonreferents and feature-types
in an array. It seems that although adult speakers engage in comparison activity,
their descriptions do not follow in the most efficient way. As overinformativeness
is more common when dealing with complex arrays, a resource-sharing account
would suggest that overinforming requires fewer processing resources. Longer, all-
inclusive descriptions are easier to produce due to a lack of comparison activity,
especially when cognitive resources are being spent elsewhere (i.e. in linguistic
production processes). Relatedly, as referring and resolution is a collaborative pro-
cess, speakers can produce their descriptions in the knowledge that their hearer
can indicate if the expression is inadequate, reinforcing the knowledge that a full
scan is not compulsory, particularly in highly interactive discourse contexts (cf.
Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986).
Pechmann (1989) found that amongst his adult sample, 21 % of REs were over-
specified, and suggested that it is the incremental nature of speech processing
which drives overspecification: adults start speaking before they have scanned the
whole array and deduced the distinguishing features of the target referent (render-
ing the early part of the RE noncontrastive). In this study, the overspecified part of
the description was almost always colour. Since colour is an absolute rather than
a scalar attribute, it can be articulated without looking to nonreferents. Under this
account, the process of generating referring expressions would first involve object
location, then a simultaneous calculation and articulation of distinctive features.
Thus, one potential cause of overspecification is incremental/incomplete scanning
and comparison activity before articulation begins. Because it bypasses the need
to undertake detailed and precise comparison activity, overspecification requires
fewer cognitive resources. It also appears that lack of scan may be more likely in
complex or highly interactive discourse situations.
With the availability of eye tracking techniques, it is now possible to examine
the relationship between visual scene interrogation and articulation of perceived
attributes (and in turn, how the conventional ordering of attributive adjectives in
a particular language may constrain both the searching and articulatory process-
es). The literature to date indicates that lack of complete scan may result in overin-
formative REs, but more work is needed in this domain to draw firmer conclusions.
. Perceptual salience
Certain attributes appear more frequently in overspecification. Notably, it was col-
our which was the overspecified attribute in 98 % of cases of overspecification in
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Pechmann’s 1989 work. In addition to being central to the creation of a gestalt,
colour is high on the perceptibility hierarchy by virtue of quick processing by the
visual system (Arts 2004, 2011), which may lead to quick encoding or lack of attrib-
ute suppression in REs. Mangold & Pobel (1988) ran a referential communication
task, wherein a target from an array of 24 shapes differing along colour, size and
shape dimensions was referred to by speakers. The marked target could be de-
scribed by mentioning a totally discriminating feature (an attribute shown by the
target only), a partially discriminating feature (shared by some of the competitors),
or a totally nondiscriminating features (shared by all of the competitors). Two ma-
jor referential patterns emerged: partially discriminative features were more com-
mon in overspecifications than nondiscriminating features, and the chances of
overspecification were increased when the totally discriminating feature was rela-
tively low in perceptual salience (i.e. size or shape). Thus, colour attributes are
commonly provided even when they do not function as a distinguishing feature.
Colour terms may be so commonly overspecified that they function in a fundamen-
tally different way to other adjectives. For example, they are not interpreted con-
trastively, as shown by the lack of an early bias in referent identification, cf. the
strong early effects found on processing scalar terms (Sedivy et al. 1999).
Carbary & Tanenhaus (2008) tested the hypothesis that the presence of an at-
tribute in an array-competitor would increase the incidence of overspecified REs.
Their arrays consisted of one target and three unrelated items (no shared attrib-
utes) in one condition, and another condition in which one of the competitors
shared an attribute of the target (e.g., striped cat and a striped shirt). In the first,
they found 11 % overspecification, rising to 25 % in the second, despite the modifier
not helping identification any faster than a bare noun would (the control condition
containing a contrast set yielded 90 % modification). These results suggest that the
salience of a particular attribute is increased by the presence of that attribute in a
competitor. Thus, that attribute is more accessible, increasing the likelihood of that
adjective surfacing in the referring expression.
 Hearer-oriented reasons for overinforming
. Facilitation of the hearer’s reference resolution
In encountering a salient yet noncontrastive attribute such as colour, a hearer is
able to zone in on a subset of a larger array. This is supported by evidence from
Mangold and Pobel (1988), who found that overspecification shortened identifica-
tion time if the redundant feature was better perceptible than the discriminating
feature. The utility (and thus incidence) of this type of overinformativeness may be
increased when contexts are complex or otherwise demanding (Paraboni et al.
2007), and the cooperative speaker may be motivated to reduce the search space
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for the hearer. Arts (2004, 2011) found that certain types of overspecification almost
consistently led to accelerated resolution, especially attributes concerning the loca-
tion of an object. Hypothetically, since speakers do not always know which features
the listener might notice, an overinformative ‘scattergun’ approach may increase
the likelihood of the target being hit, i.e. the features mentioned match the features
noticed. Consistent with this view is the finding that the number of choices avail-
able to a speaker when referring affects specification levels, e.g., references to peo-
ple (which vary more in terms of the potential attributes which could be used in a
RE) are more likely to be overspecified than references to furniture (Koolen et al.
2011). Conversely, when arrays are highly simplified, rates of overspecification fall
(Davies & Katsos 2009, 2013).
This type of cooperative behaviour is one of the hallmarks of pragmatic com-
munication. Following Grice (1989), REs should be adequate, efficient and sensitive
to hearer needs (Dale 1992). Speakers assess the common ground and judge what
their hearer needs to know. In discourse contexts with minimal common ground,
speakers may include redundant information to convey salience or relevance, e.g.,
This is Jacqui, my boss and to reduce the cognitive effort in resolving reference
(Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995).
Thus, speakers help out their interlocutors by providing modifiers which apply
to more than one referent, but crucially rule out some of the items in complex
arrays. Speakers adhere to listener expectation or discourse convention, and may
provide information which is not referential in function, but in some other way
communicative or pragmatically felicitous. Supporting the notion that overspecifi-
cation is a truly hearer-oriented mechanism, Ferreira, Slevc & Rogers (2005) found
their speaker-participants to overspecify more when speaking to an actual listener
than a hypothetical one.
. Overspecification as a function of discourse goals
Certain types of discourse with their corresponding goals correlate with character-
istic levels of overspecification. It is not entirely clear whether this factor is a speak-
er- or hearer-oriented process, but in line with our general emphasis on coopera-
tion in referential communication, we frame this factor as a means of lightening
the processing load for the hearer, or at least increasing the chances of the hearer
interpreting the speaker’s meaning as intended.
Maes, Arts & Noordman (2004) report an elegant study which chimes with ac-
counts of referential choice based on the accessibility of the referent (Ariel 1990,
i.a.). The framework is expanded by asserting that levels of informativeness inter-
act with discourse goals, and a fine-grained analysis of perceptual, propositional
and anaphoric overspecification reveal a correlation between overspecification and
discourse function. When speakers used information to teach a hearer a long-term
skill, there was more overspecification than when a hearer only had to execute
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the action once. Further, when the speaker and hearer could see the same array
(remotely), there was more perceptual overspecification as presumably the speaker
was concerned with ensuring that both parties had the same referent in mind be-
fore going on to issue more complex commands (strengthened by Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs’ Principle of Distant Responsibility 1986). Thus, in addition to the premise
that informativeness and activation are inversely correlated, it seems that task de-
mands strongly affect the choice of RE. Maes et al.’s work also highlights the role
of fault-criticality: overspecification is indeed expected in technical contexts where
precision is prioritised and the risk of misunderstanding is high. In line with Infor-
mation Theory, redundancy safeguards loss of information (Shannon & Weaver
1949).
. Apparent overspecification: Speakers contrast between
current and previous contexts as well as within a given
array
After reviewing the literature on speaker- and hearer-oriented mechanisms for
overinforming, an important methodological consideration should be considered
in order to provide an accurate picture of the nature of referential overspecification.
Much of the research on referential behaviour takes an ahistorical view of contrast-
iveness, i.e. comparing nonreferents to target referents within the concurrent array
only. Pechmann (1984) observed that REs do not only relate to the concurrent vi-
sual array, but also to how the referent is distinct from entities of the same overall
type in previously encountered arrays, which leave a trace in subsequent REs.
Speakers were found to stress the modifier which contrasted with the directly pre-
ceding target, e.g., a yellow flower, then a green flower, even in arrays where there
were no other flowers concurrently present (thus the modifier would not be strictly
necessary from an ahistorical point of view). This data suggests that the prior lin-
guistic contrast rather than concurrent visual contrast takes prosodic priority.
Although historical contrast has been classified as a speaker-oriented process
since the inclusion of the previous contrast is not useful as a contrast for the hearer
(Koolen et al. 2011), this referential strategy may in fact be designed to help the
listener. Pechmann (1984: 428) discusses holistic representations of objects in the
mind of the hearer, after Deutsch (1976) reported faster locating of objects when
hearers received redundant object descriptions than minimally contrastive ones.
Theoretically, the hearer is thought to construct a complete representation of the
object upon hearing its description, and the more precise the description (and thus
the representation), the faster the identification process. Further, such representa-
tions persevere across subsequent encounters with different objects, so by men-
tioning (or stressing) the feature which contrasts with objects encountered directly
beforehand, the hearer is implicitly told to adjust only that one feature, and to use
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the existing representation for all other identificational details. Clearly an economi-
cal means of processing, the importance of this endophoric (i.e. discourse-internal)
contrast was later endorsed by Levelt (1989) as gestalt creation. There may be addi-
tional reasons as to why cross-trial relationships should take priority in features
mentioned: endophoric information is more strongly established in the interlocu-
tors’ common ground whilst exophoric (i.e. nonlinguistic/visual) is less so. Further,
the endophoric relationship means that there are fewer competitors to be processed
(by definition, there is only one preceding target object). Finally, accessing short-
term memory may be quicker than processing the visual array (Pechmann 1989).
More recent work has furthered the idea of overspecification as a result of
cross-trial comparison-making. Labelled by Dale & Reiter (1995) as reference
scripts, previously used sets of features and values may be used by speakers in
subsequent REs, even if they are not contrastive in a given array. Whilst in line
with work on conceptual pacts (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Metzing & Brennan
2003), predictions from a reference script approach were not realised by some of
the older literature, e.g., Pechmann (1989: 106) wherein speakers did not produce
lists of feature-value clusters for consecutive descriptions. However, Brennan and
Clark’s (1996) work on lexical entrainment shows that increasing levels of specifica-
tion persevere over time, even when concurrent arrays do not demand a higher-
level term than the basic-level RE. For example, when a loafer was shown in an
array without any other shoes, it is labelled a shoe, then when it appears alongside
other types of shoes, it is called a loafer. Crucially, when it then appears within its
original array, speakers retain the higher-level term loafer. Barr (2007) also found
strong automatic memory effects on REs. In conditions where speakers had previ-
ously referred to shapes using modification (optimally informative in the initial
contexts), they maintained the referring strategy on later trials with new address-
ees and in contexts where modification was not required. It seems speakers find it
hard to revert to basic level terms once they have elevated the level of description
to a more specific taxonomy. This may be due to recent memory traces overriding
the more effortful strategy of audience design.
This wider view of discourse context reveals that overspecification may only
be apparent rather than truly overinformative. To recap, if an analysis of referential
context is restricted to judging minimal/redundant contrastiveness in relation to
other items in the concurrent context, speakers might appear to be overinforma-
tive. However, if the field of view is broadened to include the preceding temporal
context which is inarguably part of the discourse model, modifiers may be func-
tioning as endophoric contrasts across time. Previously used features persevere
over time to leave a trace both in the features used (i.e. modifier types such as
height or size) and the level of specification required. There are long-term effects
of overspecification which bias speakers to retain the level of previously-required
specificity even when the subsequent arrays do not demand such levels of modifi-
cation.
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 Interim summary
The review and interpretation of the literature above suggests that a) interlocutors
do not adhere to expectations to be optimally informative and instead frequently
provide modification beyond the minimal amounts required to resolve reference,
and b) there are various factors which may lead to overspecification, both speaker-
oriented and hearer-oriented. For the former set of processes, we propose that lack
of comparison activity during the speaker’s message formulation, and the percep-
tual salience of overspecified attributes may lead to the articulation of information
beyond minimal contrastiveness. Hearer-oriented factors may also play a role in
the inclusion of overinformative referential material, e.g., the desire to facilitate
the hearer’s reference resolution. Communicative goals of the discourse situation
may also influence the speaker’s inclusion of ‘extra’ material since redundancy
increases the chances of complex information being interpreted as intended. Final-
ly, adherence to previously established levels of informativeness or to specific refer-
ential pacts may also be realised as overspecified reference, and speakers may sub-
tly acknowledge contrasting referents from previously encountered aspects of the
discourse context, leading to apparent overinformativeness with reference to the
concurrent array.
 The pragmatic significance of overspecification
From the disparate factors which underlie overspecification, general pragmatic
mechanisms emerge. Pragmatic cooperation is a driving factor in referential pacts,
facilitation of reference resolution, and adjustments according to discourse goals.
Indeed, since referring is by definition a collaborative process, it would be difficult
to conceive of pragmatic considerations being divorced from the underlying mech-
anisms.
The central pragmatic inference generated by modified definite descriptions is
contrastive inference (CI), by which hearers infer meaning about the referential
context due to modification of the target referent. Referential overspecification en-
riches the discourse context, but rather than adding to the representation of the
referent in focus, it enriches the backdrop in which the referent is placed. For ex-
ample, on hearing Pass me the big book, a hearer generates a CI that there must
be a contrasting (i.e. smaller) book elsewhere in the context, as he infers a rational
motivation for the speaker’s inclusion of the modification within a defined referen-
tial context. Gricean accounts of CI state that such inferences are drawn due to REs
deviating from a default form which would conventionally be used (and expected
to be used) to refer to a sole entity of a given type. Sedivy and colleagues (Sedivy
et al. 1999; Sedivy 2003) show that in the presence of a contrast set (e.g., a tall and
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a short glass) and a competitor to the tall glass (e.g., a tall jug), hearers fixate on
the tall glass on hearing ‘tall’ and before they hear the disambiguating noun
(‘glass’ or ‘jug’). Hearers thus engage in Gricean inferencing; they reason that if
the speaker meant to refer to the tall jug, they should have referred to it without a
modifying adjective in order to avoid overinformativeness. Instead, the only object
they should refer to with a modifying adjective is the one for which there is a
contrast-mate, i.e. the tall glass, where omission of the modification would lead to
under-informativeness. In this way, Gricean reasoning facilitates and speeds refer-
ent resolution thanks to modifiers providing early cues as to the identity of the
referent.
On hearing an utterance which appears to deviate from the expected amount
of information, a hearer works to enrich the context which will in turn reinstate
the assumption of the speaker’s adherence to the second maxim of Quantity. The
context is expanded to include the presence of a contrast-mate to accompany the
referent of the modified utterance. Furthermore, by uttering the scalar adjective, a
speaker assumes that the hearer has noticed the presence of multiple glasses, and
noticed that they differ along a scale of tallness. In the process of formulating a
modified utterance, the speaker also realises that in order for the hearer to identify
the intended target, they as speakers need to provide enough information for the
hearer to identify the one which best fits the expression provided. This assumption
is in the spirit of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995), in that it ac-
knowledges that a speaker will take account of the hearer’s current cognitive state.
In the referential world, a hearer’s cognitive state can be partially inferred from
common ground, often from a shared visual field. Thus, the overspecification of
modified REs in the context of a single item of a specific type should involve greater
processing effort as the hearer looks for some relevance of the modifier once they
have appropriately discarded a contrastive function.
 The cognitive significance of overinformativeness
Referential overspecification may result from incomplete consideration of the com-
mon ground which exists between interlocutors. For example, if a speaker can see
a small and a large glass, but the hearer can only see the large glass, then the
modified RE the large glass would be overspecified for the hearer. In formulating a
message, cooperative speakers should acknowledge what is shared by their ad-
dressee and construct their utterance accordingly. In doing so, the speaker engages
in mentalising activity. Empirical research investigating this phenomenon has typi-
cally used referential communication tasks in which the speaker’s and the hearer’s
views are different, and thus the speaker has to integrate the common ground
(which contrasts with their own privileged ground) before articulating a felicitous
referring expression (Keysar, Barr & Horton 1998; Keysar et al. 2000; Nadig & Sedi-
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vy 2002; Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell 2003; Hanna & Tanenhaus 2004; Tanen-
haus & Brown-Schmidt 2008, i.a.).
Keysar, Lin and Barr (2003) claimed that although adults have a fully-fledged
Theory of Mind (ToM), they may not reliably and automatically apply it. They argue
that classic ToM tests probe metacognitive, reflective ToM (e.g., ‘where does she
think the chocolate is?’ in the prototypical Sally-Anne task) rather than its sponta-
neous usage. In a referential communication task, hearer-participants were direct-
ed to move objects around a frame. Before beginning the game, hearers hid an
object inside a bag and placed it in the frame. Occasionally, the item in the bag
more closely fitted the description which a speaker gave than a mutually visible
object, and although hearer-participants knew that the speaker did not know what
was in the bag, they often took it to be the intended referent. These results show
a strong dissociation between the ability to reflectively distinguish one’s own be-
liefs from others’, and the routine use of this ability in interaction. It is possible
therefore that overinformative speakers are behaving egocentrically because they
are not deploying their ToM abilities online. Nadig and Sedivy’s (2002) results are
compatible with this view, as the children in their study showed the ability to use
ToM to perspective-take when they must (i.e. when faced with ambiguity, and con-
sciously forming a strategy). Crucially, the overinformative children may be acting
spontaneously, i.e. without recourse to ToM, in line with Keysar et al.’s (1998)
Monitoring and Adjustment model (though see Rubio-Fernandez 2008 for a critique
of these studies).
As mentioned in our discussion of perceptual salience and overspecification,
visual processing and optimal linguistic encoding may compromise each other
through a sharing of cognitive resources. When arrays are more complex and the
number of targets increases, activation may be lower to the target(s) in question.
As a result of this, full comparison activity between the target and the nonreferents
may be sacrificed, leading to greater overspecification. Such an account is put for-
ward by Koolen et al. (2011) who found plural targets REs to be more frequently
overspecified than single target REs, and similarly by Arnold and Griffin (2007)
who found more full NP expressions than appropriate pronominal expressions to
plural targets.
In the domain of general cognitive mechanisms, recommended areas for future
investigation would be the suppression of speaker-salient features of the referent,
and the nature of comparison-making by speakers between referents and nonrefer-
ents.
 The social significance of overinformativeness
Inherent in the observation that referring is a fundamentally pragmatic process is
the fact that it is also a social phenomenon. Since expressions themselves do not
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refer, it is the user of those words (i.e. the speaker) who refers (Strawson 1950). As a
corollary the reference does not go through without an addressee. Thus by nature,
reference and its implicit informativeness is a social activity. From very early in
development (around 9 to 12 months of age), children are motivated to share enti-
ties and activities with others in so-called triadic interactions (Carpenter, Nagell &
Tomasello 1998). Even infants’ prelinguistic referential communication (e.g., point-
ing) is clearly a social act (Bates, Camaioni & Volterra 1975; Franco & Butterworth
1996; Liszkowski et al. 2004; Liszkowski, Carpenter & Tomasello 2007a; 2007b), a
communicative intention which continues into adulthood.
 Applications of research into overspecification
Fields outside of pragmatics have made helpful contributions to investigations of
overspecification. Computational linguistic research has documented high rates of
overinforming in human speech (Dale & Reiter 1995; Viethen & Dale 2006; Parabo-
ni et al. 2007; van der Sluis & Krahmer 2007; Viethen et al. 2008). This dialogue
between psycholinguistics and computational linguists has been mutually benefi-
cial:1 how speakers choose the content and form of their REs is not only of interest
to psycholinguists and philosophers of language, it is a pervasive challenge for
natural language generation systems. Such systems aim to approximate the types
of utterances that human speakers produce in dialogue to single out a target object
from other objects in an array. The descriptions produced by computational algo-
rithms have made substantial progress in achieving minimal contrastiveness in
machine-generated speech, e.g., the full brevity algorithm (Dale 1989; 1992) and
the incremental algorithm (Dale & Reiter 1995; van Deemter 2002) but in light of the
frequent overinformativeness found in naturalistic human speech in authentically
complex contexts, there remains a quantitative and qualitative gap between hu-
man and computer-generated speech. Corpus-based and experimental methods
have recently been used to evaluate computational models against human-pro-
duced data (Gatt et al. 2007; Gatt & Belz 2008; Viethen & Dale 2008), and further
collaboration between psycholinguists and computational linguists is keenly en-
couraged (van Deemter et al. 2009), particularly to inform questions around audi-
ence design, interactivity, multimodality, common ground, and under- and overin-
formativeness.
 See the many publications emerging from the NWO Vici project, 2008–2013: Bridging the gap
between psycholinguistics and computational linguistics: The case of referring expressions: http://
bridging.uvt.nl/
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 Future directions
Research on overspecification is in robust health across linguistics, psychology and
computer science, benefiting from its interdisciplinarity. Whilst production of over-
informativeness has been measured and analysed across many studies dating from
the early 1980s, the impact of this pragmatic phenomenon is yet to be fully ex-
plored from the comprehender’s perspective. Future research should use experi-
mental methods which measure not only the behavioural but also the neuropsy-
chological effects of processing these types of utterances (e.g., Engelhardt, Demir-
al & Ferreira, 2011).
At the beginning of the chapter, we proposed that there may be multiple inter-
acting contextual factors which impact on the choice of RE. One key recommenda-
tion for future research is to examine which factors inherent in discourse/experi-
mental tasks invoke higher and lower rates of overspecification, as a means of
tracing causal patterns for the attested rates of overspecification. One could start
by examining the interaction of visual and linguistic processing. The emerging
finding that overinformativeness increases when aspects of the visual display are
made more salient addresses the need to delineate the conditions under which
human speakers overspecify.
Beyond the scope of this chapter is the large literature on the development of
reference which lends useful insights from children’s use of overspecified reference
to the current debate (e.g., Flavell et al. 1981; Dickson 1982; Sonnenschein & White-
hurst 1984; Revelle et al. 1985; Lloyd, Mann & Peers 1998; Matthews et al. 2006,
2007; Huang & Snedeker 2008; Davies & Katsos 2010; Nilsen & Graham 2012; Ban-
nard, Klinger & Tomasello 2013; Morisseau, Davies & Matthews 2013). We expect
that future endeavours will continue in tandem with these areas.
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